Logical Status of the Concept of Language-Game in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

The present work deals with a fresh voice on Wittgenstein’s thought. It spells out the origin of language-game; it abandons the calculus conception of language and thereby philosophical investigation tries to show the logical status of concept “language-game”. The logic of language-game reject meta-language and the metaphor “river bed of thoughts”. As a result, the said rejection brings out a change. This work also points out Wittgenstein’s argument against Augustinian conception of language; it shows hw his views on picture inform theories of meaning fails to formulate the rules of logical grammar in the knowledge claim-context. Further, this work points out the Augustinian picture of the essence of human language is primitive and prelinguistic. It is the prototype of a way of thinking and its behaviour is not the result of thought. This causes a failure to explain the natural language. Thus, the primitive conception of naming language-game cannot be a basis for other language-games. Because, the logic of actual language-game has a rich variety of qualifying games to replace or to reorient the logical thoughts through a comparison and contrast or look and see process of analysis of the use or words. How do we do it? We do it through the study of language-game as a form of life which establishes the logical distinction between belief and faith, seeing and seeing as, experiencing and experiencing as. The book also explains why are not religious statements taken as empirical/historical facts. Subsequently, it points out that like the concept “morality”, “region” has not got a single meaning and to play a religious language-game is to exhibit a form of attitude in human view of life. The move for understanding the religious language through the model of scientific use is both unwarranted and unsound. And, the work shows that the logic of “ought” language is different from the logic of “is” language and the attempt to reduce it to that of “is” language is radical and not logically sound. This illuminates new kind of logic in Wittgenstein’s concept of language-game.