Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare

Naval Postgraduate School professor and former career Special Forces officer Hy Rothstein examines why the U.S. Military cannot conduct unconventional warfare despite such a capability. He argues that although the operation in Afghanistan appeared to have been a masterpiece of military creativity, the United States executed its impressive display manner –despite repeated public statements by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld that terrorists must by fought with unconventional capabilities. Pointing out that the initial phase of the war was appropriately conventional given the conventional disposition of the enemy, Rothstein maintains that one the Taliban fell and the war became increasingly unconventional, the U.S. response became more conventional. In this book, Rothstein presents an authoritative overview of the current American way of war and addresses the specific causes of the “conventionalization” of U.s. Special Forces, using the war in Afghanistan as a case study. He draws a distinction between special operations and unconventional warfare, reminding us that the use of Special Forces does not automatically make the fighting unconventional, and he questions the ability of U.S. Forces to effectively defeat irregular threats. In conclusion, the author suggests ways to regain lost unconventional warfare capacity.