This book argues that the civil service in India is too big, costs too much, and lacks the capacity to carry out economic reforms. It does not seem to be accountable for what it does. The task of civil service reform, it is argued, is not merely one of trimming the service or building capacity, but also of holding the civil service to account for its actions. This book is about building such a civil service: one that is lean and accountable. Drawing on the insights of public choice theory, modern institutional economics and agency theory it suggests that the essential task is one of designing an efficient contract between the minister and the civil servant, in order to clarify the relationship between the two and the expectations regarding performance. The book analyses the experience of the World Bank in sub-Saharan Africa that underwent limited reforms, of Japan and Singapore’s incremental reforms, and of New Zealand and Britain, with their fundamental reforms–the ‘new public management movement’. Building on this analysis, it proposes an agenda of reform for India. Such reform, the book argues, should ideally be located in the context of structural adjustment, implying that changes in the civil service should come about as part of comprehensive changes in the economy and the public sector. Written by a senior civil servant, this book is essential reading for anyone interested in civil service, politics and reform in India.
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