The present work consists of an analytical study and critique of certain aspects of Buddhist tradition as they bear upon some central problems of logic contology. The author examines the logical, epistemological and contological doctrines of Dignaga, Dharmakirti and Ratnakirti on the one hand and of W.V. Quine on the other. She agrees with Quine that a sharp line of demarcation between analytic and synthetic statements is untenable and she argues that a position similar to Quine’s obtains in the writings of the Buddhist logiclans. She provides convincing arguments to the effect that the Buddhist logicians ‘ rejection of substance ontology leads to the rejection of any claim to theultimacy of the analytical synthetic distinction. Divided into seven chapters and documented with Preface, Bibliography and general Index, this work is a rare contribution in the field of comparative philosophy.
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