Naturalistic Ethical Theory is an inquiry into the logical structure of ethical naturalism from the point of view of ethical methodology. The author shows that G.E. Moore’s model of ethical naturalism tends to make naturalistic ethics impossible. His findings suggest two alternatives: (1) Either to give up the expression "ethical naturalism" as inadequate and misleading for purposes of describing those ethical theories which are empirically biased and in particular to give up Moore’s model as totally unsatisfactory: or else (2) to treat his model at best to be one of the several forms of ethical naturalism and to describe ethical naturalism in a way in which it conforms to the actual practice of the traditionally well-known ethical naturalists like Bentham and Mill. The author accepts the second alternative: and as a result of his study of Mill, Spencer, Perry, and Dewey he has developed a new model of fully the semantical and logical autonomy of ethical discourse while fully affirming the use of scientific method in critics.
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