Other Minds: Analogical Argument Revisited

As the title indicates, the present work is chiefly concerned with the task of overcoming certain forms of skepticism regarding other-minds that have plagued and perplexed philosophers throughout the ages. The focus is on epistemological skepticism; skepticism about our knowledge of particular mental states of other people – the specific problem of other-minds. The entire work has been brought out in five chapters. In the chapter I one concern has been to bring together significant contributions made by the three classical philosophers, namely, Plato, Aristotle and Descartes to the philosophy of mind so that the chief source of the specific problem of other-minds might be traced. The chapter II starts with a review of the suggested remedy of the analogical argument for other-minds as we find it in the classical philosophy – in th view of Descartes, Locke and Hume. Chapter III attempts at understanding Malcolm’s and Ayer’s views regarding the ‘Knowledge-problem’ and ‘Meaning-problem’ about other-minds, and makes a proper assessment of their views. Chapter IV is an attempt to set out briefly the difficulties that stand in the way of accepting the views held by some contemporary thinkers, namely, Hilary Putnam, Alec Hyslop and Alvin Plantinga, on the traditional analogical position. In the last chapter the task has been two – (i) To explain the errors made by earlier thinkers in their attempts to reinforce the analogical argument; and (ii) to lay bare the structure of the analogical argument and its logical orientation.