The Pakistan Army has always occupied a dominant position in Pakistan. It has been customary to refer to the ‘3 As’ governing power equations in Pakistan – “Allah, America & Army,” of which certainly the Army has proved most omnipotent. This monograph traces the historical influences which shaped the Army’s functioning. It delineates how the Army is adapting its doctrinal moorings to new priorities, both in respect of its arch-enemy – India and newly emerging domestic terrorism threats. A critical view is taken of how the Army has tried to balance peace negotiations with selected ‘Good Taliban’ in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas with use of newly learnt military tactics of counter-terror operations. It studies ethnic factors which influenced initial recruitment, imparting a predominantly Punjabi character and more recent efforts to change the Army’s ethnic profile. It also examines the impact of Islamic conservative ideas as the Army grappled with the war against terror after 9/11. An effort has been made to examine mistakes made in domestic and foreign policies while the Army remained at the helm, the ISI’s evolution to its dominant position seen through the Afghanistan prism, the setback to the Army’s image after Osama bin Laden’s killing by American special forces in Abbottabad in May 2011, which cumulatively dimmed its lustre in the perceptions of people in Pakistan. The monograph also looks at compulsions of the civil-military relationship even as Pakistan seems poised for the next phase of a democratic political makeover, which if allowed to happen smoothly, may well herald a process of gradually sending the Army back into the barracks. Even if this happens, the Army is unlikely to easily relinquish control over key areas of geo-strategic policy-making extending to India, Afghanistan and the nuclear policy. It may not, however, be averse to let the civilian political transition proceed as long as it is allowed to have a controlling veto over these issues from behind the scene.
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