The book explains the much talked about rule-following skepticism and its attempted solutions in the contemporary epistemology. Kripke’s rule-following skeptic, by demonstrating the possibility of multiple interpretations of a given rule, poses serious problem for rule-governed behaviours and objectivity and necessity of knowledge. Kripke’s skepticism is equally applicable to Goodman’s new riddle of induction and Quine’s indeterminacies.
After a critical discussion of different suggested solutions the book aims to provide a straight-solution to the problem from a Wittgensteinian perspective. It argues that the necessity and objectivity of knowledge can be recognized by noting the universal aspect of rules. The normativity of the linguistic rules is provided in the form of human commitment to rules and their following. One and the same sentence can be shown to be true, empirically, analytically and metaphysically in the language. Thus, it provides the highest order of necessity, which includes metaphysical, scientific and the logical.
The book will benefit the philosophers and social scientists in theoretical understanding of issues related to rule and its following, framing policies and guidelines.
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